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MARTHA A. FIELDt
Since 1941, when the Supreme Court decided Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co.,' abstention has become an accepted
procedure in the federal courts. By abstention I refer to
"Pullman abstention," which comes into play when a federal
court is faced with an unclear issue of state law whose resolution
might avoid or modify a federal constitutional question. I am not
going to discuss the quite different doctrine, embodied in the
Younger v. Harris decision,2 counseling against federal interfer-
ence with state criminal proceedings, although that doctrine as
well is sometimes termed "abstention."
Pullman abstention has as its purpose avoiding federal court
error on state law questions that arise in federal constitutional
cases and that are within the federal courts' pendent jurisdiction.
Two risks are thought to result from a federal court ruling er-
roneously on such state issues: The court may needlessly have to
reach a federal constitutional issue that a proper interpretation
of state law does not in fact present; or the federal court may
interfere with legitimate state policy by interpreting state legisla-
tion more narrowly than the state judiciary would interpret it.
The mechanism for avoiding federal error in the interpretation
of state law is to remit the parties to the state courts for decision
of the unclear state law question. The parties retain the right to
return to the federal forum for decision of the federal issues in
the case, 3 unless the state question proves dispositive of the con-
troversy. Indeed, the federal court usually retains jurisdiction of
the lawsuit while the parties pursue their state law remedies.
4
* This Article was developed from a speech delivered at the 46th Annual Judicial
Conference of the Fourth Circuit, held at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, in
june 1976.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1965, Radcliffe
College; J.D. 1968, University of Chicago Law School. Member, District of Columbia
Bar.
1 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
2 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
3 See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
4 For a more thorough exposition of the basics of the Pullman abstention doctrine
and the author's views concerning it, see Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The
Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974).
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The basic theory behind Pullman abstention may seem at-
tractive, in that erroneous decisions are minimized by splitting
the lawsuit and allowing each jurisdiction, state and federal, to
make an authoritative pronouncement on its own law. From the
outset, however, Pullman abstention has proved far from ideal in
practice. The extreme delays inherent in the abstention proce-
dure, and the attendant expense, have been chronicled many
times. Essentially, the parties to a case in which abstention is
ordered must undergo two lawsuits instead of one, because their
cause is bifurcated between state and federal courts. When a
federal court abstains in an action before it, the plaintiffs must
commence a new lawsuit in state trial court, usually a declaratory
judgment action, to have the unclear issue of state law resolved.
They must work their way up through the state appellate system,
usually without getting any priority on crowded state dockets,
before the state issue is settled, so that they can return to the
federal system for resolution of federal issues, with the attendant
appeals.' The prospect is hardly a happy one for litigants. It may
deter them from seeking a federal forum in the first instance, or
it may, once abstention is ordered, induce them to cut their costs
by presenting all issues to the state court for decision and waiv-
ing their right to return to federal court on the federal issues. 6
Plaintiffs in federal constitutional cases seem a singularly inap-
propriate group thus to discourage from access to the federal
courts.
The delay and expense inherent in the abstention proce-
dure are legendary, and have caused some judges and commen-
tators to bemoan the doctrine from the outset.7 Those qualities
are exacerbated, however, by three less often noted problems
with Pullman abstention, which I wish to point out here. The first
relates to the reviewability of abstention decisions; the second
involves misuse of the abstention procedure to accomplish pur-
' The right to factfinding by a federal tribunal, see England v. Louisiana State Bd.
of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416-17 (1964), may cause a federal court at this
stage to make new factual findings, even concerning issues that the state court has
already determined. If it should reach conclusions differing from those of the state
judicial system, the state and federal facets of the lawsuit would presumably be decided
according to conflicting factual theories.
6 Voluntary presentation of all issues to the state court constitutes a waiver of the
right to return to the federal forum for adjudication of the federal issues. England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
7E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 180 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Kur-
land, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24
F.R.D. 481 (1959); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEx. L. REV. 815
(1959).
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poses other than clarification of state law; the third concerns the
possibility that abstention in a particular case will not result in
any state supreme court pronouncement on the controverted
state law question. I conclude that the abstention procedure is
not worth its costs; if state court clarification of state issues is
deemed necessary, certification of the issues directly to the state
supreme court is a preferable device.
I. ISSUES CONCERNING PULLMAN ABSTENTION
A. Reviewability of Abstention Decisions
The law is unsettled concerning whether or not abstention
orders are appealable. 8 The Supreme Court has reviewed several
decisions to abstain9 without clearly resolving the issue of ap-
pealability. Indeed, in one case the Court reviewed the absten-
tion order while limiting its grant of certiorari to exclude the
issue of the order's appealability!"'
There are three possible avenues to appellate review of ab-
stention orders. The first would characterize the orders as "final
decisions" appealable under section 1291 of the Judicial Code. 1
This approach has Supreme Court support, 12 but several absten-
tion orders that the Supreme Court has reviewed have arguably
been final decisions only because the abstaining court had re-
ferred all the issues in the case-federal as well as state-to the
state judiciary.1 3 The appellant was thus "effectively out of
I Compare 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.20[4.-2], at 251 (2d ed. 1975) (taking
the position that abstention orders are appealable as long as no action is pending in the
state courts when abstention is ordered), with AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 291-92 (1969) (dis-
cussed in note 37 infra) (taking the position that abstention orders are not appealable).
'See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); NAACP v. Ben-
nett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959); Count), of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185
(1959); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
"' Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 26 n.1 (1959).
There may be a reason peculiar to that case rendering the order appealable: The case
was an eminent domain proceeding, which is an action at law, unlike the usual Pullman
abstention proceeding, which is an action in equity. See notes 21-30 infra & accompany-
ing text. The Fifth Circuit had relied on this fact in holding the order appealable. City
of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 255 F.2d 774, 777-78 (5th Cir. 1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
1I 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). This section gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction to
review; the Supreme Court could then review their decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1254
(1970).
12 Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962).
I3 Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Idlewild Bon Voyage
Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962); County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959); cf. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962);
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court"'1 4 in those cases to a greater degree than he would be in
the usual abstention situation, in which the federal district court
retains jurisdiction of the cause and affords the parties a right to
return to federal court for initial determination of the federal
issues. Because the latter procedure clearly is required today,
15
Pullman abstention decisions deviating from it should be review-
able in any event under the All Writs Act 16 as abuses of dis-
cretion.1 7 Decisions that do follow the proper procedure, on the
other hand, could not as readily be characterized as final under
the effectively-out-of-court rationale. One might argue that they
also are final because the long road that litigants must travel in
order to return to federal court may well discourage their re-
turn. Or one might stress the importance to the litigants of the
abstention decision and the unremediable hardship imposed by
a wrongful order that is not immediately reviewed.' 8 These
rationales for finality, however, are uncertain of success.' 9 Un-
NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959) (in both Turner and Bennett, the district court
had purported to refer only state issues to the state court, but at a time when it was not
yet established that there is a right after abstention to return to federal court). Idlewild
is the only one of the above cases in which the Court made reference to the issue of
reviewability.
14 Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962)
(quoting the court of appeals' opinion, Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan,
289 F.2d 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1961)).
" England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
17 See text accompanying notes 38-40 infra.
1 Cases that might provide a basis for this finality argument include: Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 478 (1975); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,
379 U.S. 148, 152-54 (1964); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 557-58
(1963); Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 548-50 (1963); Cohen v. Benefi-
cial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949).
In Cox Broadcasting Corp., Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting from the Court's con-
clusion of finality in that case, gave an explanation of the Court's holdings of finality in
Curry and Langdeau, cases involving review of state court decisions, that would be help-
ful in an argument that orders of abstention are final. He said that Curry and Langdeau
"are based on the understandable principle that where the proper forum for trying the
issue joined in the state courts depends upon the resolution of the federal question
raised on appeal, sound judicial administration requires that such a question be decided
by this Court, if it is to be decided at all, sooner rather than later in the course of the
litigation." 420 U.S. at 506. Orders of abstention similarly might be considered final
because of the importance of determining the proper forum at the outset, though
clearly no review at all will be had of abstention orders unless it is had immediately.
" In Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945), the Court defined a final judg-
ment as one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to
do but execute the judgment." Id. at 233. See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Gileo, 351 U.S.
493, 495-96 (1956); Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112, 118 (1934). In Schoenamsgruber v.
Hamburg Am. Line, 294 U.S. 454, 456 (1935), the Court held that an order staying
proceedings pending arbitration was not final.
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less one of them is adopted, section 1291 is a very limited
means for review of abstention orders.
20
A second possible avenue of review is section 1292(a) of the
Judicial Code, giving courts of appeals 'jurisdiction of appeals
from: (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts . . . grant-
ing, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions..
"21 The Supreme Court could then review the decisions
under section 1254 of the Judicial Code.22 Stays issued in fed-
eral proceedings so that the parties will repair to state court
could be reviewable under this provision if they were consi-
dered injunctions against the federal proceedings.23 They have
traditionally been so regarded only in legal proceedings and not
in equitable ones. Through a series of Supreme Court
decisions, 24 the rule has evolved that
[a]n order staying or refusing to stay proceedings in
the District Court is appealable under § 1292(a)(1) only
if (A) the action in which the order was made is an
action which, before the fusion of law and equity, was
by its nature an action at law; and (B) the stay was
sought to permit the prior determination of some
equitable defense or counterclaim.25
Although little in the way of reasoning supports this rule,
26
20 Some court of appeals cases hold abstention orders final although the abstaining
court retained jurisdiction. Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F.2d 1272 (Ist Cir. 1972) (seemingly
deeming all abstention orders "clearly appealable," id. at 1274 n.3); Amdur v. Lizars,
372 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967) (saying such stays are usually not appealable but that the
one in question was because it amounted to a dismissal); cf. Kelley v. Metropolitan
County Bd. of Educ., 436 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972)
(reviewing as final a stay to await Supreme Court decisions because the rights of the
parties required immediate adjudication); McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (holding final a stay of federal civil proceedings pending federal criminal
proceedings against the defendants because of the indefiniteness of the stay and be-
cause the defendants' rights would be irretrievably lost unless adjudicated immediately).
9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.20[4.-2], at 251 (2d ed. 1975), takes the position that
an abstention order is final, so long as the state law action deferred to has not com-
menced at the time abstention is ordered.
21 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970).
22 1d. § 1254. Under the same reasoning, the Supreme Court could review absten-
tion orders of three-judge courts. See id. § 1253 (1970).
23 Alternatively, they would be characterized simply as rulings regarding the man-
ner in which the proceedings would be tried and would not be appealable. See City of
Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 257 (1949).
24 Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955); City of Morgan-
town v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254 (1949); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317
U.S. 188 (1942).; Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
' 5 Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844, 845 (5th Cir.) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis in original), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962).
26 What reasoning exists is too esoteric to reproduce in any detail. The basic theory
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and although it is widely criticized,27 most courts still follow it
today. If it is adhered to, the utility of section 1292(a)(1) in
Pullman abstention cases is severely limited.28 The second part
of the rule, requiring that the purpose of the stay be to allow
prior determination of an equitable defense, could be satisfied
if a court were willing to regard as equitable a declaratory
judgment action; it is such an action that usually will be com-
menced in state court after an abstention order.2 9 The first part
builds on the fact that prior to 1915 a defendant could present an equitable defense to
a legal action only by bringing an independent suit in equity to enjoin the action at law.
Therefore, when an equitable defense to an action at law is interposed today, the
theory is that the defendant is really seeking the aid of equity to enjoin the action, and
an order staying or refusing to stay is one granting or refusing an injunction. This
despite the merger of law and equity in 1938.
The rationale, by its terms, is not available when the defense is not equitable or
when the original action is not at law.
The most coherent summary of the cases and explanation of how the theory
evolved can be found in C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 460-61 (2d ed. 1970).
2
11d.; 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.20[3], at 245-46 (2d ed. 1975). Many
courts, including the Supreme Court, have criticized the rule though they have felt
obliged to follow it. See, e.g., Chapman v. Int'l Ladies Garment Workers' Union, 401
F.2d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1968); Travel Consultants, Inc. v. Travel Management Corp.,
367 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Glen Oaks Utils., Inc. v. City of Houston, 280 F.2d 330,
333, 337 (5th Cir. 1960). The Supreme Court in Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v.
Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 185 (1955), felt that relief from the rule must come from
Congress, not the Court.
28 Note, however, that one commentator believes that the rule does not properly
apply to Pullman abstention cases and that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970) allows appeal
in those cases as long as injunctive relief is sought. 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
110.20[4.-2], at 251 (2d ed. 1975). The courts have not agreed, however, see Mercury
Motor Express, Inc. v. Brinke, 475 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1973); Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 255 F.2d 774, 777 (5th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 360
U.S. 25 (1959), discussed in note 10 supra and in Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d
844, 846 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962); Jewell v. Davies, 192 F.2d 670 (6th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952); nor has the American Law Institute, see
note 37 infra & accompanying text.
29 In Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 891 (1962), the court regarded a declaratory judgment action as analogous, for
these purposes, to the old bill in equity, quia timet. It is not at all clear, however, that
declaratory relief would be generally so regarded. See, e.g., Simler v. Connor, 372 U.S.
221, 223 (1963).
It might appear advantageous to one seeking to appeal an abstention order to
characterize declaratory relief as legal rather than equitable with regard to the first part
of the rule-requiring that the cause in which the order was made be at law. In Ameri-
can Safety Equip. Corp. v.J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1968), the
court held that the declaratory judgment action brought before it should be considered
legal (because absent the availability of that relief a legal action would have been
brought) and that the stay pending arbitration was therefore appealable.
If declaratory judgments were considered legal, then Pullman abstention cases often
would involve both equitable and legal relief because requests for declaratory relief
often are joined to requests for an injunction. It is not clear how the law/equity distinc-
tion for appeals should apply in a situation in which both legal and equitable relief is
sought, though a dominant-purpose test or an essential-nature-of-the-action test seems
the prevalent solution. See, e.g., Western Geophysical Co. of Am., Inc. v. Bolt Assocs.,
Inc., 440 F.2d 765, 771 (2d Cir. 1971); Schine v. Schine, 367 F.2d 685, 688 (2d Cir.
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would be impossible to satisfy in most Pullman contexts, how-
ever, because Pullman abstention cases ordinarily will be in
equity.
30
In Glen Oaks Utilities, Inc. v. City of Houston,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, believing that a
prior Fifth Circuit decision adhering to the prevailing law/equity
distinction "precluded [it] from saying that stay orders, in all
cases where the decision of another court is awaited, are injunc-
tive in nature and appealable, '32 found another way to review
stay orders under section 1292(a)(1): The court held that the
stay order in question "was for all practical purposes, a denial of
the temporar), injunction which was sought. '33 Section 1292(a)(1)
1966) (Friendly, J., concurring); Alexander v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 332 F.2d 266, 268
(9th Cir. 1964); cf. Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304 (2d Cir.
1967) (holding that an action should be considered equitable when both legal and
equitable relief is sought unless the equitable relief can be characterized as "merely
incidental," id. at 309). Under these tests, the action would doubtless usually be consid-
ered equitable. See note 30 infra. And even if the plaintiff in a Pullman abstention case
had the foresight to allege only declaratory relief, the action might well be considered
equitable rather than legal, under the reasoning of American Safety Equipment, because
absent the availability of declaratory relief an injunction probably would have been
sought. Cf. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672-74 (1950) (exis-
tence of federal question jurisdiction in declaratory judgment proceeding depends on
whether the action that would have been brought, absent the declaratory procedure,
would have qualified for federal question jurisdiction).
'" To some, it is the equitable discretion of the federal judge as chancellor that
justifies the abstention procedure at all, see Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 500 (1941); cf. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28
(1959) (the Court ordered abstention in an eminent domain action but analogized that
type of proceeding to an equitable action); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315,
317-18 (1943) (a federal court having jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin enforcement of a
state commission's order may, in its sound equitable discretion, refuse to exercise its
jurisdiction if granting relief would be prejudicial to the public interest); Harlow v.
Ryland, 172 F.2d 784, 786 (8th Cir. 1949) (federal court, as court of law, must exercise
jurisdiction to decide state law questions, unlike other cases in which federal court, as
court of equity, may in exceptional circumstances decline to decide doubtful questions
of state law), and the usual Pullman abstention case involves an attempt to enjoin state
action as unconstitutional. On occasion, however, the Court has abstained in simple
damage actions without mentioning the issue. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41
(1970) (per curiam); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134
(1962) (per curiam).
3, 280 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1960).
32 Id. at 333.
3 3 1d. (emphasis added); see Clean Air Coordinating Comm. v. Roth-Adam Fuel Co.,
465 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1117 (1973); United States v. Lynd,
301 F.2d 818 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 893 (1962); Jewell v. Davies, 192 F.2d 670,
673 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952); cf. Mercury Motor Express, Inc. v.
Brinke, 475 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding a stay order reviewable because it was
accompanied by a denial of a preliminary injunction); Weiss v. Duberstein, 445 F.2d 1297
(2d Cir. 1971) (holding an order of abstention appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
(1970) because it was coupled with a denial of a motion for summary judgment that
had the effect of a denial of a temporary injunction that the plaintiffs had sought).
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can thus allow appeal of some stay orders, even in equitable
actions; it may, however, be of limited utility. Under that
rationale, appeal is available, obviously, only when a temporary
injunction is sought.3 4 In Glen Oaks, the court also emphasized
that no relief was sought except for temporary and final injunc-
tions; this could prove to limit the rule further. More basically,
characterizing a district court's action as a refusal of a temporary
injunction may not be possible when "a practical assessment of
the case" shows "that the court's action did not even imply a
preliminary assessment of the merits of the claim for injunctive
relief, including the claim of irreparable injury. '35 The factors
going into an abstention decision can easily be sufficiently inde-
pendent of the merits of the cause that appeal will not lie under
the Glen Oaks rationale.
Apparently on the theory that no appeals were available
from stays issued in equitable proceedings, 36 the reporters of the
American Law Institute, writing in 1969, believed that the law
did not allow for appeal of abstention orders.37 They recom-
mended retaining the ban on appeals and allowing review only
under a third possible avenue of review: the All Writs Act.38
The All Writs Act would permit review by mandamus when the
appellate court determines that the trial court has abused its
discretion in staying an action.39 If this were the exclusive route
34 Cf. Ferrara v. Louisiana, 443 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1971) (appeal dismissed because
no injunction was sought and because the stay order issued by the district court was not
equivalent to an injunction); Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471 (1970) (construction of an
analogous statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970), governing interlocutory appeals from
three-judge courts to United States Supreme Court). For these purposes, preliminary or
temporary injunctions are distinguished from temporary restraining orders. See, e.g.,
Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1960); Pennsylvania Motor Truck Ass'n v.
Port of Philadelphia Marine Terminal Ass'n, 276 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1960); Connell v.
Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 240 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1957).
35 Dellinger v. Mitchell, 442 F.2d 782, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see Switzerland Cheese
Ass'n v. E. Home's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966).
"6 See 43 ALl PROCEEDINGS 365-66 (1966) (remarks of Judge Friendly and Profes-
sor Field).
" The reporters' draft made no express provision for review of abstention orders
and their commentary indicated their belief that the absence of an express provision
would preclude appellate review except under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1970). AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 291-92.
38 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 291-92. The All Writs Act is codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
39 See Dellinger v. Mitchell, 442 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1971); ACF Indus., Inc. v.
Guinn, 384 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968); Leesona Corp. v.
Cotwool Mfg. Corp., 308 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1962); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1955); International Nickel Co. v. Martin J. Barry, Inc., 204 F.2d
583, 585 (4th Cir. 1953); Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180,
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to review, as the American Law Institute prefers, 40 review would
be limited to extraordinary cases.
Thus far, the discussion has concerned primarily review of
lower court decisions to abstain. When a court refuses a request
for abstention and instead proceeds with the cause, the ruling
clearly is reviewable, but typically it is not reviewed immedi-
ately;41 it is reviewed only after the trial court has disposed of
185 (1952); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 291-92.
Query whether abstention is appropriately deemed a discretionary doctrine, be-
cause federal appellate courts both reverse lower court orders of abstention, e.g., Griffin
v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350
(1962), and order abstention themselves in the first instance, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP,
360 U.S. 167 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), and do not
seem in any case to allow the district court's ruling to stand for the simple reason that
the district court so ruled, see Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207, 223 n.17 (1960)
(Black, J., dissenting). But see, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 29, quoted
in note 30 supra; Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534, 537 (1965); Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27 n.2 (1959). Were mandamus the sole
route to appellate review, however, as it sometimes is today, see Dellinger v. Mitchell,
442 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1971), only egregious error on the part of the trial court would
be correctible and less evident error would be left undisturbed. In effect, therefore,
trial courts would be accorded a measure of discretion.
0 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 291-92.
41 Of the three avenues of review discussed above, the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (1970), could conceivably allow immediate review of refusals to abstain. The
American Law Institute, endorsing the All Writs Act procedure, noted that mandamus
would be available "[i]f the rare case should ever arise in which refusal to abstain was
such an improvident exercise of discretion vested in the district court that appellate
review was indicated .. " AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 292.
The only other avenue to immediate review of refusals to abstain would involve
characterizing a request for abstention as a request for an injunction against the federal
proceeding. If that characterization were accepted across the board, then grants or re-
fusals of the requested "injunctive" relief would be appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1) (1970). As noted above, however, text accompanying notes 21-30 supra, the
law/equity distinction prevents this avenue of review from having much significance in
the Pullman abstention context. And advocates of abolition of the distinction would not
increase instances of appealability; usually their position is that appeals should be al-
lowed in none of these cases, not in all of them. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 26, at
460-61; 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.20[3], at 245-46 (2d ed. 1975). But see Glen
Oaks Utils., Inc. v. City of Houston, 280 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1960).
The other rationale for appealability under § 1292(a)()-the Glen Oaks, or denial-
of-temporary-injunction rationale-would be available only for grants of requests for
abstention, not for refusals to abstain. Unlike a decision to abstain, which amounts to a
decision not to grant the requested relief for the time being at least, a decision to
proceed with the cause cannot be characterized as an interlocutory order "granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or
modify injunctions," 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970), because it says nothing bearing on
the grant or refusal of the requested relief.
Moreover, a decision not to abstain has never been held final and hence appealable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). (A finality argument would be difficult to make, be-
cause the court that decides not to abstain generally proceeds directly to determine the
merits. Note, however, that Mr. Justice Rehnquist's point, quoted in note 18 supra,
would support finality here.)
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the case on its merits. 42 Problems concerning piecemeal review
are not present, therefore, but the practice has problems of its
own: It means that a party who has had his case decided on the
merits in the federal district court and the court of appeals may
face an abstention decision in the Supreme Court of the United
States.43 Indeed, that Court may raise the abstention issue on its
own motion, though no mention has been made of it earlier in
the litigation.44 The parties are then remanded to state court to
start the litigation anew on state issues, perhaps years after their
lawsuit began, and the disposition of the federal issues that have
already been fully adjudicated is set aside.45
The costs of such a system are obvious, and yet a solution to
the problem is not. Although the current system is wasteful, an
earlier review would interrupt and delay the lawsuit, often un-
necessarily. The difficulty in reaching an acceptable solution is
largely a function of the looseness of the standards for absten-
tion. Ideally, the criteria for abstention should be sufficiently
definite that they could be applied at the outset of the litigation
42 This method of proceeding obviously is not available when the court's decision
favors abstention; unless review is immediate, the decision is not reviewable at all.4 3 E.g., Harris County Comm'rs' Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77 (1975); Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941);
cf. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 393 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (com-
plaining that "petitioners seek to upset the result of more than two years of trial and
appellate litigation on the basis of a point which they first presented to the Court of Ap-
peals upon petition for rehearing"); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,
377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964) (refusing to hold under the circumstances that the district
court sriould have abstained).
" Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439, 443 (1971) (dissenting opinions
of Burger, C.J. & Black, J.); cf. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411 (1964) (district court abstained sua sponte); Harris County Comm'rs' Court
v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 81 & n.3 (1975) (the parties had not raised the abstention issue
with any clarity); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959)
(district court abstained sua sponte).
'5 In Harris County Comm'rs' Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77 (1975), for example,
the district court had enjoined a challenged redistricting plan on the ground that it
violated the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court on review directed the district
court to abstain on the state issue before reaching the federal constitutional one. The
state issue, which the district court had not decided presumably because it was unclear
that the plaintiffs had raised it, see id. at 81 & n.2, was whether the redistricting plan
violated the state constitution.
In Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), the district court had held that the chal-
lenged provisions violated both the Alaska Constitution and the Federal Constitution.
The Supreme Court directed the state court to abstain on the state issue before reach-
ing the federal one.
In both cases, decision of the state issues would not change the posture of the
federal issue but might simply affect the necessity of reaching the federal issue. It
seems unfortunate for a decision with this purpose to be rendered at such a late stage,
after the federal issue, which undoubtedly is in the case, has been fully litigated by the
parties and has been fully adjudicated by a three-judge district court.
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without substantial risk of error; the long process of litigating
the question which is the proper tribunal in which to litigate
could thereby be foregone. But because the availability of absten-
tion depends primarily upon the degree of unclarity of state
legal issues, and because some ambiguity can be detected in al-
most any legal rule, the instances in which abstention should be
ordered do not lend themselves to any definite codification.
When the standards provide such little guidance, it is dif-
ficult to leave the subject to the unreviewable discretion of trial
judges. It would be particularly troublesome to do that, in my
view, in instances when abstention is ordered, for that decision
can be enormously important to the litigant who has chosen the
federal forum, and he has a statutory right to pursue his cause
there. Even if the abstention doctrine legitimately modifies that
right, at least the federal system should assure itself before allow-
ing the litigant's ouster from federal court that his case falls
within the scope of the abstention doctrine.
I would suggest, therefore, allowing review of decisions to
abstain, as is the practice today, and clarifying the doctrinal basis
for that review. (My own approach would be to deem abstention
orders final decisions despite the retention of federal jurisdic-
tion, because of the importance of the decision to the litigation
and because it contemplates at least an extensive interruption in
the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 46 ) It seems to me less trouble-
some, however, for refusals of requests for abstention to be
unreviewable. 47 Support for the view that declining to abstain in
a case appropriate for abstention is not nearly as serious as ab-
staining erroneously can be found in last Term's decision in Col-
orado River Water Conservation District v. United States. There the
Court stressed that "[a]bstention from the exercise of federal
jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. 'The doctrine of ab-
stention . .. is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the
duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly be-
fore it' ,,48 Declining to abstain is not as serious because federal
" See cases cited notes 18 & 20 supra.
17 The possibility of immediate review under the All Writs Act for abuses of discre-
tion could remain. I share the skepticism of the American Law Institute, however, that
such a case will ever arise. See AMIERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 292, quoted in
note 41 supra.
48 Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)
(quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)).
Elsewhere in the Colorado River case, Mr. Justice Brennan referred-citing England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964); McClellan v. Car-
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jurisdiction to decide the state issues does exist. Moreover, dis-
trict judges' capability concerning state law decisionmaking
should not be overlooked or minimized; they are generally fa-
miliar with the law of the state in which they sit. The strongest
argument in favor of unreviewability of decisions not to abstain,
however, is avoidance of the costs of the current system. Allow-
ing a trial judge in his unreviewable discretion to proceed with
the lawsuit, of which the federal court in any event does have
jurisdiction, seems to me preferable to allowing referral to state
courts after full adjudication of the controversy.
Not only should a district court's refusal to abstain be a final
determination that the case will be adjudicated in the federal
forum. Also, raising the abstention issue for the first time on
appeal should not be permissible. Nor should appellate courts
abstain on their own motion. Abstention would thus be waiv-
able, as it is not today. 9 Insofar as abstention exists to protect
the interests of the parties (especially the interest of the state
as a party), it seems sensible to rely on the parties raising the
issue, and doing so at the district court level, and not unfair
to preclude them if they do not raise the issue at that time.
Insofar as the doctrine is designed to protect federal interests,
the costs to the system of entertaining suggestions of abstention
after full determination of the merits seem to me too great to
justify that practice.
50
In sum, I would allow federal courts to review lower court
orders of abstention, as they now do, because the need for re-
view is greatest in those cases. I would, however, take away fed-
eral appellate courts' power to order abstention in the first in-
stance, because the costs of abstention are greatest when a case
has already been decided on its merits. Such a rule would aid the
reviewability problem, however, only by minimizing the impor-
tance of the abstention device. It is very far from the current
practice of allowing abstention at either level of the federal ap-
pellate system, even on the court's own motion.
land, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910); and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404
(1821) (dictum)-to "the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to ex-
ercise the jurisdiction given them." 424 U.S. at 817.
41 See cases cited notes 43-44 supra.
"' The federal interest that abstention sometimes serves is the federal policy of
avoiding federal constitutional decisionmaking. For an example, see note 68 infra.
When abstention is considered after the trial court has disposed of the controversy, the
federal constitutional questions have already been decided, at least at the trial court
level, or else the state law has been interpreted in such a way as to avoid them.
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B. Misuse of Abstention
The second problem that I wish to mention concerning ab-
stention is a tendency on the part of some federal courts to
utilize the abstention procedure for purposes other than those
for which it was designed. As stated earlier, the aim of abstention
is to obtain the correct solution to a difficult and important ques-
tion of state law, in order to facilitate the correct disposition of a
federal lawsuit; delay is an unfortunate by-product of the proce-
dure. A survey of abstention decisions, however, raises the ques-
tion whether delay is not sometimes the aim of the abstention
procedure, and the desirability of obtaining a clarifying state
decision simply the excuse for the delay. When, for example, a
lawsuit presents a federal constitutional attack on a state pro-
gram that does not seem politic at the moment to resolve, absten-
tion may appear a convenient device for removing the parties
from federal court, for the time being at least. Even if they
persist in demanding a federal forum to resolve their federal
claims, abstention will put them off for a number of years.
The principal standard for abstention, which relates to un-
clarity in the state issue, is so much a question of degree and is so
subjective that misuse of the abstention doctrine cannot be de-
tected with any assurance and also cannot be controlled effec-
tively. Yet, an examination of a series of abstention decisions
does suggest that in situations in which the enunciated tests
apply equally, abstention is sometimes ordered and is sometimes
not,5' and that federal judicial views concerning the merits of the
federal cause of action are often the impetus for an abstention
ruling, quite apart from the need for clarification of state law. A
Justice committed to environmental controls who generally op-
poses abstention, for example, may be the first to abstain in an
environmental case in which the lower court ruling was unfavor-
able to the environmentalists. The lack of clarity in state law he
detects to justify the abstention seems largely illusory. 52 Absten-
11 Compare Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) and Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S.
678 (1964) (in which the Court ruled against abstention because of the clarity of the
state law issues), with Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972), Fornaris
v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970), Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), and
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (in which the Court deemed state law suffi-
ciently ambiguous to require abstention).
52 Most frequently, Pullman abstention cases involve individuals attacking state
statutes as violations of their civil liberties. The plaintiffs' interests opposed to absten-
tion are individual civil liberties interests; state interests favor it. See, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Harri-
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tion then becomes merely a device to set aside a lower court
ruling thought undesirable for reasons having no relation to the
abstention doctrine.
53
If I am correct in detecting the existence of this practice, it is
an unconscionable one. A wish to avoid or postpone decision of a
particular constitutional issue should not occasion abstention
when the federal tribunal has no real need for state advice con-
cerning state law. Even if one accepts Professor Bickel's thesis
that the federal courts (and particularly the Supreme Court) may
properly invoke justiciability doctrines to avoid making decisions
that seem impolitic,54 the abstention doctrine is not an appro-
son v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941) (the most substantial attack on the challenged order was raised by intervenors,
claiming unconstitutional racial discrimination). Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406
U.S. 498 (1972), however, involved private companies' attacks on a state statute protect-
ing the environment. Business interests, then, instead of individual civil liberties in-
terests, stood in the posture of opposing abstention, and a vote for abstention was a
vote favoring environmental controls. Mr. Justice Brennan authored the opinion of the
Court in Lake Carriers, an opinion that ordered abstention. Although Mr. Justice
Brennan's statements concerning abstention in that opinion appear consistent with his
remarks on abstention elsewhere, it is somewhat unusual to find him among the Justices
considering state law "far from clear," 406 U.S. at 511, for purposes of ordering absten-
tion, when there is dissent on that issue. See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167
(1959). The shift in Chief Justice Burger's position concerning abstention that the Lake
Carriers situation brought about is a more noticeable one. Earlier the Chief Justice had
taken the position that a state should have the first opportunity to pass upon a state
statute without regard to whether it is ambiguous, and that plaintiffs' interests are ade-
quately served by the availability of a state forum. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.
433, 440-43 (1971). The Chief Justice also had previously been rather quick to find
uncertainty in state law, and to order abstention on that basis. Id. at 440 n.1. In Lake
Carriers, however, the Chief Justice joined an opinion dissenting from the order of
abstention; taking the position that the challenged state law, though unconstrued, was
not ambiguous; and emphasizing the plaintiffs' right to choose a federal forum to ad-
judicate their controversy.
Mr. Justice Douglas, ordinarily a vociferous opponent of abstention, see, e.g., Harris
County Comm'rs' Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 89 (1975) (dissenting opinion); Manard
v. Miller, 405 U.S. 982 (1972) (dissent from affirmance of order to abstain); England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 423 (1964) (separate opinion);
Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207, 227 (1960) (dissenting opinion); Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179 (1959) (dissenting opinion), has favored abstention in en-
vironmental cases. He joined the majority in the Lake Carriers case. He also wrote for
the majority in Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), in which the Supreme Court
reversed a three-judge court decision holding unconstitutional, under state and federal
law, an Alaska law limiting fishing rights on a grandfather-clause basis. The Court
ordered abstention on the state constitutional issues.
53 The crucial difference between this illegitimate use of abstention and the legiti-
mate use of it to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisionmaking, described in note 68
infra, is that in the latter case the state issue is genuinely ambiguous and state law
clarification is sought in good faith.
" A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962). But see Gunther, The
Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial
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priate tool of avoidance. Its inappropriateness for this function is
evident because it is not available in all constitutional cases but
only in those that happen to contain state law issues. And unlike
the justiciability doctrines, which bring the litigation to a close,
abstention sends the litigants to state court with a promise of ul-
timate return to the federal court. Sending them on such a jour-
ney with an aim simply to postpone a federal decision disre-
gards their legitimate interest in not incurring needless expense.
It also adds unnecessarily to state court dockets, thereby ignor-
ing and belittling state court needs to keep abreast of increasing
caseloads. If delaying constitutional adjudication is ever a valid
judicial objective, abstention, therefore, should not be its tool.
Formulating a doctrine that focuses on the actual reasons for
avoiding a decision, and that simply postpones or avoids the de-
cision if that is the aim, would be far preferable to using absten-
tion to force an essentially purposeless state court litigation.
C. Absence of Input by the State Supreme Court
A final point I wish to mention in connection with absten-
tion is a very simple one, but it is the most fundamental objection
of all: After the parties have undergone the lengthy process of
litigating in lower state courts, an abstention may be rendered
utterly purposeless in any given case by the state supreme court
declining to review the lower court's ruling. A lower state court's
guess as to how the state supreme court would decide the dis-
puted state law issue may not be any more informed than the
federal court's would be. And the whole purpose of abstention is
to obtain the state supreme court's pronouncement. The United
States Supreme Court has recognized this fact when it has ab-
stained in situations in which lower state court opinions deciding
the ambiguous issue were available but in which the state su-
preme court had not spoken. 55 Yet the abstention procedure,
Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1959).
" Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970). Fornaris involved construction of
the Puerto Rican Dealers Contract Law, which provided that local dealers" contracts
with manufacturers were terminable by the manufacturers only when there was "just
cause" to terminate. Fornaris sued in a Puerto Rican court for damages resulting from
an allegedly unlawful termination, and defendant Ridge Tool Company removed to
federal district court on diversity grounds. The district court denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss on the ground of the alleged unconstitutionality of the Dealers Con-
tract Law, whereupon an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970)
was taken to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
The First Circuit's opinion, 423 F.2d 563 (1970), notes that the Dealers Contract
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with all the costs it imposes, does not even necessarily lead to ob-
taining that state supreme court pronouncement which is the
raison d'&tre for abstention!
II. SHOULD PULLMAN ABSTENTION BE ABANDONED IN FAVOR
OF A CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE?
The conclusion I would draw from all this is that Pullman
abstention is not worth its costs. If some means of receiving state
court input on unsettled issues of state law is deemed necessary,
a certification procedure, under which a federal court that needs
clarification of a state legal issue makes its inquiry directly to the
supreme court of the state, seems vastly superior. Certification is
currently available only in states that have chosen to authorize
it.56 The procedure is frequently criticized because of the delay
Law had been considered by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico in Construction Mach.
& Supplies Corp. v. Construction Mach. Co., Civ. No. 67-3349 (Super. Ct. of P.R., San
Juan Section Dec. 23, 1968) and had been upheld in the face of a similar constitutional
challenge. 423 F.2d at 564. Briefs submitted to the court* of appeals cited the
Construction Machine & Supplies case and discussed the superior court's treatment of the
"just cause" standard in the statute. Brief for Appellee at 35-36, 38, Fornaris v. Ridge
Tool Co., 423 F.2d 563 (Ist Cir. 1970) (quoting the superior court's discussion of 'just
cause"); Supplementary Brief for Intervenor at 4, Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d
563 (1st Cir. 1970) (filed by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) (citing the Construction
Machine & Supplies opinion). Although noting in dicta that "[w]e do not agree with the
position of the opponents of the act that the phrase 'just cause' is unconstitutionally
vague and unspecific," 423 F.2d at 568, the court of appeals did hold the Dealers Con-
tract Law unconstitutional because it retroactively altered contractual obligations in vio-
lation of due process. Id. at 567.
In its brief per curiam decision, the Supreme Court reversed and ordered absten-
tion "until the Puerto Rican Supreme Court has authoritatively ruled on the local law
question in light of the federal claims." 400 U.S. at 44 (footnote omitted). Beginning
with the proposition that the Dealers Contract Law was "a rather vague Puerto Rican
law that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has not authoritatively construed," id. at 43
(footnote omitted), the Court ignored the lower Puerto Rican courts' construction of
"just cause" that had been presented to the court of appeals, preferring instead the
authoritative construction of the term yet to be rendered by the supreme court of the
Commonwealth.56See, e.g., COLO. App. R. 21.1; FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1946); HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 602-36 (1965); ME. R. Civ. P. 76 B; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 490 (1968) (App. R. 21);
WASH. REV. CODE § 2.60 (1965).
Congress could dispense with the need for state authorization and require states to
entertain certified questions. See generally Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme
Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 214 (1957); 44 ALl
PROCEEDINGS 130-31 (1967) (remarks of Professor Wright). But cf. Note, Inter-jurisdic-
tional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 344, 357-58 (1963) (suggests that compelling state courts to hear certified ques-
tions is not conducive to cooperative federalism, which certification should foster). No
congressional statute purports to require state courts to entertain certified questions,
however, and the American Law Institute proposal concerning certified questions ex-
plicitly disavowed the notion of federal compulsion. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra
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in the federal litigation it can cause." The problem of delay can
be greatly alleviated if the state expedites treatment of certified
questions,58 but in any event certification seems inevitably less
time-consuming and less costly than abstention, because the
question referred goes directly to the state supreme court. 59 Not
only are its costs less; its benefits are greater. Although certifica-
tion could share the first two problems discussed in connection
with abstention-the question can be raised whether review of
certification orders should be allowed and certification can be
used as a delaying tactic-it avoids the critical third problem,60
note 8, at 295.
Congressional power would stem from article III in conjunction with the necessary
and proper clause. It may also be that article III gives the federal courts power, without
any congressional authoritization, to compel certification. See Note, Consequences of Ab-
stention by A Federal Court, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1358, 1368 (1960).
"7 See, e.g., AMERICA, LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 293; Mattis, Certification of
Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 717, 725-27 (1969). But see note 59 infra. See also In re Elliott, 74 Wash. 2d 600,
640-41, 446 P.2d 347, 371 (1968) (Hale, J., dissenting).
5" Presumably Congress could require states to expedite, just as it could require
them to provide a certification procedure in the first instance. See note 56 supra. Alter-
natively, the federal courts could decline to utilize a state's mechanism for certification
unless the state gives priority to certified questions. Query whether such a requirement
should be imposed, however. See, Thiry v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 74 Wash. 2d 679, 684,
445 P.2d 1012, 1015 (1968) (Hale, J., dissenting) (raising the question why the certified
case should "have been given a priority over the several hundred cases already pend-
ing" when nothing in its facts warranted unusually expeditious treatment).
59 justice Wernick, of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, states not only that
"the extra costs to the litigants in money, energy, time and general inconvenience are
likely to be far less in the certification process than in [abstention]," but further that
the costs are "likely in any event to be minimal." White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668, 683
(Me. 1974). He also says that "certification is likely to provide the litigants with a de-
cision of the highest court of the State, as a definitive determination of the state law
issues, almost as speedily as they would have the federal Court's (non-definitive) decision of
them (if the federal court does not abstain)." Id. (emphasis added). He concludes that
litigants probably would consider whatever costs there are "as, on balance, a price worth
paying for the enormous benefit of a reasonably speedy definitive determination of the
state law questions." Id.
60 Moreover, the other two problems are lessened to the extent that certification
involves less delay than abstention does. Obviously there is less temptation to use a
procedure as a delaying tactic if it results in less delay, and the harm in so using it is
also reduced. Apart from reducing delay, there is no way to avoid the problem of
misuse of certification, just as there is not with abstention. It seems impossible effec-
tively to police misuse because of the indefinite standards for abstention and certifica-
tion, and it seems impossible to remove the vagueness from the standards without fun-
damentally altering the role that abstention and certification are designed to play. See
text accompanying notes 62-68 infra. The possibility of misuse, therefore, seems inher-
ent in the doctrines. That possibility can be avoided only by abandoning the doctrines
or by truly minimizing the delay that occurs in obtaining clarification of the unclear
state issue. See note 59 supra.
There also is less need to review a certification order if little cost and delay is
required to obtain the state court's response than if the order burdens the parties more
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that of the unclear state issue never reaching the state supreme
court, because the federal court refers the issue there directly.
The balance between costs and benefits therefore leaves certifi-
cation well ahead of abstention, a fact the Supreme Court has
recognized recently in suggesting that it would allow certification
more freely than abstention.6 1 If the federal judiciary were to
adopt the suggestion above of abandoning the abstention doc-
trine because its costs outweigh its benefits, but were to retain
certification, more states might allow certification to their
judiciary, in order to fulfill their interest in providing the federal
judiciary with their court's answers to unsettled questions of state
law.
When a jurisdiction does subscribe to certification, one issue
it must face is whether to allow certification only in those circum-
stances in which abstention has heretofore been proper or in-
stead to permit it more broadly. Insofar as the case for certifica-
tion is simply its superiority to abstention in a lesser-evil sense,
the availability of certification might be limited along Pullman
lines. Although the subjectiveness of a requirement that the state
issue be unclear is troublesome for some purposes, a require-
ment of unclarity should certainly be adopted for certification.
For unless the certified state issue is quite unclear, there is no
need for certification; 62 the federal district court could safely
exercise its pendent jurisdiction and decide the state issue itself.
The other criteria for Pullman abstention, however, should not
be perpetuated, for they are not sound limitations on an absten-
tion or a certification doctrine. The most basic of these require-
ments is that the case in which state advice is sought contain a
federal constitutional issue.6 3 Another arguable requirement is
severely. The degree of burden to the parties would be a factor as well in determining
whether an order could be characterized as final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). See
note 18 supra & accompanying text. Because the extent of delay will vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, depending upon such things as the extent of the backlog of the
state supreme court and whether certified questions are given priority on the docket,
orders of certification should perhaps be final and reviewable in some jurisdictions and
not in others. If the parties are substantially burdened by the order it should be review-
able, for the same reasons abstention orders should be, and refusals to certify certainly
should not be reviewable. See notes 45-50 supra & accompanying text.
61 Bellotti v. Baird, 96 S. Ct. 2857, 2867-68 (1976); Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416
U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974).
6'2 For a case recognizing that a certified question should be unclear, see Thiry v.
Atlantic Monthly Co., 74 Wash. 2d 679, 682, 445 P.2d 1012, 1013 (1968).
63 Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 490 (1949) makes it clear that this is a require-
ment of Pullman abstention. See also Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236
(1943). Abstention does not, however, always serve the interest of avoiding federal con-
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that the action be one to enjoin a state statute or program.6 4 One
reason behind these traditional limitations on Pullman absten-
tion-limitations that are not always followed today65-may be to
limit abstention to cases in which it is particularly important
that the state issue be correctly decided. I would suggest re-
placing the specific limitations with a general precondition to
certification that the state issue on which clarification is sought
be an important one; answering the issue correctly should be
sufficiently important that deferring to the state supreme court
is worth the costs involved.
66
It is much more costly to make a mistake on some state law
issues than others. Just as with Pullman abstention it has not been
deemed worth involving two jurisdictions in disputes between
two private litigants when erroneous decision of the state issue
would not have ramifications beyond the immediate parties,67
such disputes should not qualify for certification. At the opposite
extreme, consider, for example, a case concerning a right to
treatment to be inferred from a state constitutional provision
that arguably grants the right but that well may not. Even if a
stitutional adjudication. In Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), for
example, the district court had avoided decision of the federal issues but the Supreme
Court still ordered abstention, thereby furthering the different purpose of avoiding
harm to state interests through error on issues of state law. If abstention can be or-
dered when it serves only that purpose, whether or not the case contains a federal
constitutional issue should be irrelevant. The holding of Louisiana Light & Power Co.
v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), supports this position, although the Court
adopted another rationale. See generally Field, supra note 4, at 1093-106, 1136-38.
64 The vast majority of Pullman abstention cases fit this mold, although occasionally
the Supreme Court had ordered abstention in cases in which no arm of the state was a
party, or in which only damages were sought, without discussing its appropriateness. See
Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (per curiam); United Gas Pipe Line Co.
v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962) (per curiam).
" See note 64 supra.
66 Of course, in those jurisdictions that manage truly to minimize the costs-by
devices such as giving certified questions priority on their dockets-see note 59 supra,
the calculus of how readily to abstain would be different than in those jurisdictions in
which certification is more time-consuming.
67 1 take this to be the rationale of the Pullman limitations, a rationale reflected in
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), which held abstention unavailable in a
simple diversity case. It should be noted, however, that a decision may have broad
ramifications even if the state is not a party (or if other traditional limitations are not
met). If, for example, a federal cotrt, in an action between private parties erroneously
strikes down a state taxing provision, that decision might have as severe consequences
for the state as if it were party to the action. Cf. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal
Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962) (per curiam) (vacating judgment of court of appeals
to allow construction of city tax ordinance by state courts in contract suit between pri-
vate parties in which the court of appeals had held the tax ordinance invalid under the
commerce clause). If so, it should qualify for certification withQut regard to whether it
is a suit to enjoin state action as unconstitutional.
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federal district court believes that the state supreme court would
recognize the right, such an important announcement of state
policy arguably should be made by the state judicial system
rather than the federal. At least the federal court that is ruling
on the issue should require of itself more certainty in the cor-
rectness of its result than it would were the issue less significant;
if in doubt on such an important issue, the court should refer
the question to the state system more readily than it would refer
a less important issue.
6 8
An obvious disadvantage of a prerequisite to certification
that relates to the importance of correct resolution of the state
law issue is the subjectivity and indefiniteness of that criterion. It
is as vulnerable to these criticisms as the unclarity requirement,
the indefiniteness of which is the source of the problems dis-
cussed earlier concerning review of abstention decisions and
misuse of the abstention procedure. Nonetheless, the aid of the
state judicial system should not be sought except when the
ramifications of a wrong decision in the particular case will be
felt widely and deeply enough to justify the costs of involving the
state judiciary. And it is better to address directly the question of
the importance of correct decision than it is to adopt a set of
criteria (like the traditional Pullman limitations) that overall
probably relate to the more significant cases but that may or may
not accurately reflect the importance of ruling correctly in a
particular case.
If certification is limited to situations in which state law is
extremely unclear and in which a mistake on the state law issue
could have serious ramifications, and if the delays in the certifi-
cation procedure can be kept to a minimum, certification may be
a satisfactory answer to the abstention dilemma.
6' The purpose in avoiding state law error in some cases will not be to avoid harm
to state interests but instead to avoid unnecessary decision of federal constitutional is-
sues. If, for example, a state statute is challenged as violative of both the state and
federal constitutions, and the federal district judge, in the absence of abstention, would
uphold the statute under state law, the interest abstention serves is avoiding unneces-
sary decision of federal constitutional issues. Or, if a state statute is challenged under
the Federal Constitution alone, and the statute could be interpreted in such a way that
the federal constitutional issue would be avoided, abstention by a federal judge who in
the absence of abstention would interpret the statute to raise the constitutional issue will
further the purpose of avoiding constitutional litigation. See also notes 50 & 63 supra.
A requirement that it be important to decide the state issue correctly, in cases in
which the purpose of abstention is to avoid federal constitutional decisionmaking,
would call for a judgment whether the constitutional question is of a type that should
be avoided. If it were a routine or settled question for example, the importance crite-
rion would not be satisfied and certification would be improper.
1977]
